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SELECTION AND RETENTION-A JUDGE'S
PERSPECTIVE
Robert F. Utter*
"One more thing, gentlemen, before I quit. Thomas Jefferson once
said that all men are created equal . . . [but] we know that all men
are not created equal in the sense some people would have us believe
-some people are smarter than others, some people have more opportunity because they're born with it, some men make more money
than others, some ladies make better cakes than others-some people
are born gifted beyond the normal scope of most men.
"But there is one way in this country in which all men are created
equal-there is one human institution that makes a pauper the equal
of a Rockefeller, the stupid man the equal of an Einstein, and the ignorant man the equal of any college president. That institution, gentlemen, is a court. It carl be the Supreme Court of the United States or
the humblest J.P. court in the land .... Our courts have their faults,
as does any human institution, but in this country our courts are the
great levelers, and in our courts all men are created equal."'
If all persons are to be treated equally in our courts, the process of
selecting judges to oversee courts must be one that insures selection of
efficient, intelligent and compassionate judges. It must also be one
that insures selection and retention of judges who are truly able to
administer, and give the impression that they are administering, their
duties impartially to all. Toward this end, the Citizens' Committee on
Washington Courts2 examined the current process for selecting judges
and recommended a constitutional amendment which, if approved,
would substantially improve the process by which judges are now selected in Washington state.
* Justice, Supreme Court of Washington; B.S., University of Washington, 1951,
LL.B., 1954.
1. H. LEP, To KILL A MOCKINGBiRD 217-18 (1960).
2. The Citizens' Committee on Washington Courts was formed by interested Washington residents in 1966. It consists of citizens throughout the state who have no formal
connection with the legal community. An outgrowth of the Committee's 1966 conference was a proposed constitutional amendment creating an appellate court to relieve
the Washington Supreme Court of a portion of its workload. This amendment was approved by the voters in November 1968, and the court was subsequently established by
implementing legislation.
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The Citizens' Committee's proposal for selecting judges is part of a
proposed constitutional amendment which would refashion the entire
3
Judicial Article of the Washington State Constitution. Section 94 of
the proposed amendment provides that all judges and justices shall be
selected by the governor from nominees approved by a judicial nominating commission. There would be a separate judicial nominating
commission for the supreme court, for each division of the court of
appeals, and for each district of the superior court and district court.
Each commission would consist of three lawyers, two members of the
judiciary, and four lay citizens. 5 All commission members would be

3. For a discussion of the entire proposed amendment, see Professor Rieke's article
at pages 811-838 of this volume.
4. Section 9 of the proposed amendment provides:
Section 9. SELECTION AND TERMS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES.
(1) Nomination and Appointment. Appointment to the vacancies and positions
for justices and judges shall be made by the governor from nominees approved by a
judicial nominating commission. If a vacancy remains unfilled for six months, the
chief justice may make an appointment of a nominee approved by a nominating
commission.
(2) Initial Term. The initial term for each justice or judge, appointed to a vacancy or a position, shall be for four years after appointment and until the second
Monday of January following a judicial election held after the expiration of the initial four-year term.
(3) Retention Elections. At the judicial election immediately preceding the expiration of each term, the justice or judge shall stand for retention. Any justice or
judge who was elected to his office prior to the effective date of this article shall, at
the expiration of the term for which he was elected, stand for retention. The question submitted to the voters at any such election shall be whether the justice or
judge shall be retained for an additional six-year term. The position of any incumbent who fails to receive a majority vote for retention shall be deemed vacant as of
the second Monday of January following the election.
5. Section 18 of the proposed amendment provides:
Section 18. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS.
(1) Number. There shall be judicial nominating commissions. Unless combined
by statute or by rule authorized by statute to serve more than one court or more
than one geographic area, there shall be one commission for the supreme court, one
for each division of the court of appeals, one for each district of the superior court,
and one for each district of the district court.
(2) Membership and Selection. Judicial nominating commissions shall consist of
two designees of the chiefjustice of the supreme court selected from the judiciary in
the geographic area served by the commission, three lawyers, and four lay citizens
who shall be selected to be broadly representative of the public interest. The time
and method of selecting the members shall be prescribed by statute.
(3) Terms and Compensation. The terms of office and any reimbursement or
compensation for members of the judicial nominating commissions shall be fixed
by statute.
(4) Limitations. No member of ajudicial nominating commission shall hold any
other public office for profit or office in a political party or organization. Judicial
members may continue to hold the state judicial office then held. No members shall
be eligible for appointment to any state judicial positon not then held, so long as he
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precluded from holding any other public office for profit and from
serving as an officer in a political organization.
Since the adoption of Washington's constitution, judges at all levels
in the state have had to run for office in a popular election on a nonpartisan platform. The present term of office is six years for the supreme and appellate courts and four years for the superior, justice and
municipal courts.6 Both the nine-member supreme court and the
twelve-member court of appeals have one third of their members running in each general election held in even-numbered years. Judicial
candidates first appear on the ballot in the primary election. If there
are only two candidates or if one candidate receives over fifty percent
of the vote, the winner of the primary election appears unopposed on
the general election ballot. If there are more than two candidates and
no candidate receives over fifty percent of the vote, the two highest
candidates proceed to the general election ballot.
Under the proposed amendment, the initial term for each appointee
to the bench would be four years, after which time a "retention election" would be held in which the electorate would simply vote on
whether the judge should be retained for an additional six years. Subsequent "elections" would be held every six years. The governor, with
the approval of a judicial nominating commission, would appoint replacements for all judges who fail to receive a majority vote for retention.
Two aspects of the Citizens' Committee's proposal for selecting
judges suggest that it is worthy of serious consideration. First, while
the proposed selection process is not a radical departure from the
practical operation of the present system, it would insure greater citizen input. Second, since the proposed selection method would not
require judges to conduct periodic election campaigns, it would alleviate many of the inherent problems the present election process creates for lawyers, judges, and the public.

is a member of a judicial nominating commission, nor for a period of one year
after the expiration of the term for which he was appointed to the commission.
(5) Duties. The primary duty of the judicial nominating commissions shall be to
make investigations and determine the qualifications of the available candidates to
fill judicial vacancies or positions. When a vacancy occurs in any judicial office, the
commission shall submit lists of qualified candidates for judicial office to the governor as required by statute. Additional duties may be created by statute.
6. See WASH. CONST. art. 4, §§ 3, 5 and 30; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.06.070 (Supp.

1972), 3.04.080 (1959) and 3.14.020 (1959).
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That the Citizens' Committee's proposed selection method is not a
radical departure from the practical operation of the present system is
evidenced by the fact that most judges presently serving in the state
initially were appointed to the bench. Indeed, seventy-five percent of
the judges serving on the superior court, ninety-two percent of the
judges serving on the court of appeals, and sixty-six percent of the
supreme court justices were appointed to office by the governor whose
executive action is required by the fact that most judicial vacancies
arise between elections. In addition, while there is no constitutional
provision obligating the governor to consult with the bar association
prior to making judicial appointments, the bar association traditionally has been asked to submit recommendations to the governor's
office and with few exceptions appointments have been made from
these lists. The Board of Governors of the State Bar Association submits the recommendations which it receives from its judicial selectior
committee for vacancies occurring on the supreme court and court o
appeals. Similarly, the county bar associations submit lists of recommended candidates to the governor's office for superior court vacancies and, in a few instances, submit lists of recommended candidates
to the appointing county or municipal bodies that fill vacancies in the
district and municipal courts.
Under the Citizens' Committee's proposal, judges still would be
appointed, but unlike the operation of the present system, lay citizens
would be represented on the bodies charged with the responsibility of
submitting approved candidates to the governor. Further, although
the citizenry would not be given the periodic opportunity of choosing
between two candidates under the proposed plan, it nevertheless
would still have the opportunity periodically to reject a judge appointed by the governor and approved by the appropriate judicial
nominating commission.
The present system of selecting judges by election creates many
problems for members of the bar which will be eliminated if the proposed selection method is adopted. Since the present selection method
pits two lawyers seeking judicial office against one another in an election campaign, it is only natural that candidates call upon their colleagues of the bar for support. Traditionally, lawyers have responded
to such calls for support by joining sponsoring committees, publicly
endorsing the candidate, sending endorsement cards to friends,
erecting yard signs and engaging in other activities designed to iden-
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tify the candidate with the lawyer and to promote name familiarity for
the candidate.
However, requests for such support can create serious problems for
lawyers. First, financial pressures caused by campaign contribution
requests can be serious. Since candidates for judicial position look to
the bar for their financial support, lawyers may find themselves in an
untenable financial position when there are multiple judicial races
with worthy candidates in each of them deserving support. Second, a
lawyer who opposes an incumbent or supports a candidate who might
not be successful may be taking a risk. It would be naive to suggest
that lawyers are insensitive to the possibility that ill will may be created by publicly supporting a candidate who unsuccessfully challenges
an incumbent.
The reaction of a victor in a campaign varies--some judges are
gracious to all who appear before them in court, while others are
highly critical of lawyers who have actively supported an opponent. In
any event, the lawyer who supported the victor's opponent, and perhaps to a greater extent that lawyer's client, often will wonder whether
his case would have been treated more favorably by the court if tlie
lawyer had supported the judge who heard the case. Of course, the
magnitude of the risk will bear an inverse relationship to the size of
the county in which the lawyer practices.
The dilemma facing a lawyer who must choose between candidates
for judicial positions is heightened by the great discretionary powers
given judges. Although most judges exercise discretion impartially,
superior court judges occasionally have the opportunity to reward
their supporters financially if they so choose. For example, the appointment of appraisers for estates or receivers for insolvent corporations can provide a lucrative reward for those who aided the victorious
judge. While some counties in the state have taken steps to insure
that these selections are made on the basis of merit, others have not.
The mere appearance of a judge's ability to reward his supporters
financially and discriminate against those who did not support him
creates a situation which can only reduce public confidence in the judiciary.
The present process of electing judges creates another problem for
the bar, deterring many of its most capable members from seeking
judicial office. To be sure, the disparity in income between a judicial
position and a successful law practice alone sufficiently discourages
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many lawyers in this state. Nevertheless, many extremely able lawyers
might be willing to make this financial sacrifice if they did not have to
wage a costly and superficial campaign in order to secure a judicial
office. A lawyer willing to spend large sums of money can succeed in
establishing the degree of name familiarity needed to win an election.
Similarly, an incumbent with wide community name familiarity who
has not earned the support of his fellow lawyers nevertheless may be
invulnerable because the more capable members of the bar are financially unable to generate the publicity needed to unseat the incumbent. The publication of the results of polls of the bar as to the merits
of judicial candidates generally has not been a determinative factor in
judicial elections in this state.
Viewed from the bench, the present election system presents an
equivalent number of problems. Facing an election, the judge realizes
that he probably will be elected or fail to be elected on the irrelevant
issue of name familiarity. On occasion, candidates seeking election
actually have promised to take specific attitudes in particular cases,
apparently not realizing that such promises could cause their disqualification from those cases. The temptation is great to espouse a politically advantageous judicial philosophy, such as a hard line on criminal sentencing. The failure of the public as a whole to realize that a
judge cannot commit himself to a course of action prior to hearing a
particular case compounds the temptations, placing contenders and
incumbents alike in an extremely difficult position.
The nonpartisan nature of judicial campaigns in this state effectively shields the candidates from open partisan politics. While this is
commendable, it also causes partisan party organizations to be unavailable to candidates, compelling candidates for judicial positions to
develop their own campaign organizations, which is a difficult, expensive and time-consuming task in a large county and a staggering effort
on a state-wide basis.
Vastly increased campaign costs present a serious obstacle to judicial candidates. In 1964 the average cost of election for a superior
court judge in the largest metropolitan county in Washington state
was approximately $15,000. This provided for minimum newspaper
coverage with no radio or television exposure. By 1968 the cost of a
similar campaign had increased to between $25,000 and $40,000 in
some judicial campaigns. In 1972, some candidates spoke of spending
as much as $50,000 to win a judicial campaign in that same metro-
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politan area. In addition, the cost of minimum state-wide media coverage and other incidental campaign costs in two 1970 supreme court
campaigns totalled approximately $35,000. In recent Washington
Supreme Court races, the burden of financing the campaign forced
some judges to devote most of the proceeds from the sale of their
homes to pay campaign costs.
While the financial cost of the election process is the most apparent
loss to the judge, the time spent on campaigning imposes an even
greater burden on the operation of the judicial system. The nature of
appellate work is such that a judge spends roughly one quarter of his
time on the bench and the balance of his time on work not regulated
by a precise schedule. To be effective, an appellate court judge must
be able to spend a significant amount of time preparing for hearings,
writing, maintaining contact with problems of the public and researching a variety of legal problems. Since the work of the supreme
court by its nature does not take a judge to the most populous areas of
the state, a judge is forced to publicize himself by spending time critically needed on the job campaigning and speaking on issues unrelated
to his work. This intrusion into the productive time of an appellate
court judge is a serious drawback inherent in the present elective
process. Although it is impossible to project a firm figure, my own
experience leads me to believe that appellate courts could be approximately one-third more productive if the judges did not face the prospect of periodic political campaigns. There is a similar loss of productivity at other court levels.
The bench and the bar are not the only victims of the present elective process; the public also loses when an unfit candidate is selected
for a judicial office on the basis of an irrelevant issue such as name
familiarity. This state has an excellent judiciary staffed by judges who
compare favorably with the best in the nation. This condition is due
largely to the willingness of members of the bar to make sacrifices.
Occasionally, however, inadequate judges are selected under the elective system, and it is often difficult if not impossible to remove these
judges since name familiarity supplies a degree of protection that challengers often are unable to overcome. The public cannot afford to
have judges who are not the most capable the legal profession can
produce.
Finally, an equally serious threat posed by the elective system is its
assault on the integrity of the entire judicial system. Courts must serve
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the interests of all the people, and any selection process which encourages selection of judges who by temperament or inclination have no
time or desire to become aware of crucial issues affecting people of all
economic and racial backgrounds must be rejected. Lawsuits must,
however, be won in court on the merits of the particular case, leaving
no room for the subtle and not-so-subtle political pressures inherent in
an elective judiciary system. In the face of such pressure, our country's rule by law rather than men could become the ultimate victim,
seriously threatening the concept that "in our courts all men are created equal."
Fear has been expressed that if a "retention election" is introduced
it will mean, in effect, lifetime appointments for judges, without an
effective means for their removal by the voters. Experience with the
"retention election" system in other states indicates this is not necessarily the case.
Three Colorado judges who stood for retention were not returned
to office in the last election.7 In 1968 three Colorado county judges
were defeated, and a juvenile court judge was defeated in 1970.8 In
Nebraska the bar association and a citizens' group in 1972 combined
to campaign to defeat a juvenile court judge by an 85,281 to 56,562
margin. 9
As stated in a special report of the American Judicature Society,
"Merit retention has established itself as a judicial tenure device which
gives substantial assurance of security in office while still preserving
for the voter an effective voice in the process."'10
In summary, the process of selecting the judiciary by election creates difficult problems for lawyers, judges, and, ultimately, the public.
To insure that only the most capable members of the legal profession
sit on the bench and that they be able to work efficiently and dispense
justice impartially, I believe the present selection process should be
abandoned and the selection process proposed by the Citizens' Committee on Washington Courts be adopted.

7.
1972,
8.
9.
10.
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56 JUDICATURE 252, 253 (January 1973).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 254.

